We are approaching a critical moment in Turkey's modern history: the snap elections scheduled to take place on June 24 will not only switch the country's administrative system from parliamentary to presidential, but will also have important repercussions on Turkey's relations with the West. Despite Turkey's historical and institutional ties to the West, these relations today are defined by two words: distrust and crisis.
The June 24 elections in Turkey, unexpectedly announced just two months ago following a decision to bring them forward by a year and a half, promise to be mesmerizing. All elections held in Turkey are usually compelling anyway, since for the past fifteen years they have consisted of a struggle between the Justice and Development Party (AKP), its leader, the current President of the Republic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the strategies fielded by opposition parties to oppose him.
Turkish general and presidential elections will take place on June 24. Originally scheduled for November 2019, they were called a year and a half earlier than expected. It is the first vote after the 2017 constitutional referendum, which paved the way for the transformation of the Turkish system into a presidential republic, and the first consultation under the new electoral law.
In a recent ISPI article, Valbona Zeneli wrote that, despite other big actors at play, the European Union is the only game in town in the Western Balkans (WB). Is it really so? A review of the activities of the three most important non-EU players in the region - Russia, Turkey and China - points us in another direction.
In a moment of geopolitical uncertainties, fluid changes on an international level, and increase fo-cus on terroristic threats, this article wants to discuss the possible risks for energy infrastructure and examine how grave they are. Speaking with representative of the industry, think tanks, and academia, we try to shed special light on the infrastructures in Turkey and in the nearby region.
ISPI and the European Commission's Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations organized the workshop on “Boosting EU-Turkey Trade Relations and Energy Dialogue”.
Although 56 per cent of Turkish public opinion does not support Turkish foreign policy regarding Syria, due to the way Turkish government managed the human crisis (and spent its money), the population agrees on the necessity on persisting to solve this problematic situation. And thus does Europe. Following the Summit of EU leaders on October 15th, German Chancellor Angela Merkel took an emergency trip to Turkey, where she needed to recruit the Turkish side to stop the flood.
Turkey’s elections held on June 7th, which some observers argued to be the most important since the inception of democratic elections, resulted in political uncertainty. However, even that climate of uncertainty, with no actor able to form a government alone, was better than the escalating tensions that the country had experienced recently. The elections left the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) with 258 seats.
The Caucasus has been defined as a “broken region” by both practitioners and scholars. Although the regional “protracted” conflicts clearly represent a stumbling block to the development of inclusive cooperation schemes, nevertheless the “broken region” interpretation seems to hide a Western prejudice – i.e. a tendency to label as inefficient or ruinous any political relations regulated by values and interests different from the Western ones.
The economy has become one of the hotly debated topics in Turkey prior to the general elections on June 7. There is now a quasi-consensus that the upcoming election is one of the crucial turning points in the history of contemporary Turkish politics. The Justice and Development Party (AKP in the Turkish acronym), which has been ruling the country with single-party majority governments for about 13 years, aims to gain enough seats again to replace the current parliamentary system with a presidential one.
The interweaving of statements that preceded the April 24th anniversary contributed, once again, to clarify both the nature and the scope of the dispute related to recognition of the Armenian genocide. As a matter of fact, the political and diplomatic dimensions of the dispute have clearly overtaken its historical essence. This consideration appears to be evident whether looking at the dispute from the domestic Turkish and Armenian political perspectives or, rather, from the broader perspective of Ankara's and Yerevan's international relations.