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What to do with “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe”?

The summer was particularly hot in the Eastern part of Europe. The “five-day war” between Russia and Georgia over the status of South Ossetia warmed up the region. The Czech Republic and Poland swiftly concluded and signed an agreement with Washington accepting to host some US missile defence bases. Russia then informed that such a decision made Poland a Kremlin military target¹.

The EU’s neighbourhood was stirred up also by the collapse of the Ukraine’s ruling pro-Western coalition. The debate on how to react to the conflict between Russia and Georgia sparked a dispute between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko initiating a political crisis. The President gave his support to Georgia and strongly criticized Russia; other parties (including the party of Premier Tymoshenko) took a more balanced positions between the two hostile countries. In this post Cold-War Europe turbulent scenario, the September 28th elections for the House of Representatives of Belarus’ National Assembly have lost somehow salience. Although the country had been defined by the US as the “last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe”² and by

*Freedom House*³ as a “consolidated authoritarian regime” (as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), the national political event had only a limited external resonance.

There are various reasons for this international apathy toward Belarus. Firstly, the outcome of the elections would hardly have had a significant impact on the country political future. Secondly, the major international actors having an interest in the political change in Belarus are affected by a sort of “crisis fatigue” and so quite unwilling

WORLD/europe/04/20/rice.dougherty/index.html.

³ Based on *Freedom House* methodology, countries whose combined averages for democratization fall between 1.00 and 2.99 are designated “consolidated democracies”; between 3.00 and 3.99 “semi-consolidated democracies”, between 4.00 and 4.99 “transitional or hybrid regimes”; between 5.00 and 5.99 “semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes”, and between 6.00 and 7.00 “consolidated authoritarian regimes”. Consolidated autocracies are often based on strong presidential systems or one-party systems, with the opposition political parties having only a weak power. In these regimes economic power is also derived from political patronage. Usually the economic sphere is controlled by the high ranks of political power (the President and his inner circle) leaving no space for developing of a truly opposition; www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2008&country=7351&pf, August 2008.

¹ Interfax August 15, 2008.

² The definition is by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/>

Issue 100 - OCTOBER 2008

Summary

Drawing on September parliamentary elections in Belarus, this analysis argues that the West, and especially the EU, should tackle the Belarusian case jointly with Russia avoiding a new confrontation after the Georgia war. However, the EU latest decisions on Belarus seems to go in the opposite direction.

The opposition to the Lukashenka’s regime is too divided and fragmented while the president, although ruling in an authoritarian manner during the last 14 years, enjoys a certain popularity among its citizens for having safeguarded the country from the economic difficulties and political chaos experienced by other post-Soviet states.

Moreover, Belarus suffers the competition of the EU and the US, on the one hand, and of Russia, on the other hand. These forces have neither the same ascendant nor a comparable leverage.

The EU has a very limited influence while Russia is able to put under strain the country’s survival. So far the slight breaches of the regime have been caused by economic factors, and in particular by the Russian decision to increase gas prices.

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to face yet another delicate situation, after the war in Georgia. Belarus risks to be another occasion for mounting tensions between the US and Russia. The US are in the core of the electoral campaign while both Washington and Moscow are deeply suffering from a dramatic financial crisis and thus busy sorting out internal affairs and gaining consensus among their citizens. This does not seem to be the right time for fomenting a revolution in Belarus, whatever colour or nuance it could have. As usual, the EU and the OSCE, very well familiar with the requirements of free and fair elections, have been left alone, handling the boring affairs of Belarusian elections. And of course they have done their job remarkably well.

According to the OSCE, despite some minor improvements (such as the slightly increased access of opposition representatives to election commissions and the possibility to conduct meetings in authorized locations without interference) the 28th September parliamentary elections did not fulfil the organization commitments for democratic elections⁴ and none of the 78 opposition candidates won seats in the Parliament. As usual, the vote turnout was quite high reaching the 75.3%. Nevertheless, the election was freer than the previous one in 1994, when no opposition candidates were allowed to run. The police also stood back as around 1,000 pro-democracy activists marched in central Minsk on the day of the election, carrying EU flags and banners with slogans such as "Lukashenka is Europe's last

dictator" and "No to electoral farce!".

The landslide victory of the pro-Lukashenka's regime candidates is also due to a fragmented and weak opposition that shares only an anti-Lukashenka credo. It has neither been able to present an alternative project nor to channel the criticism against the regime into a unified political action. The social democratic wing, led by the Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Hramada", failed to form a united anti-Lukashenka front with the United Civic Party and the Belarusian Popular Front Revival, the two main opposition parties on the right of the political spectrum. The rightwing opposition too is quite divided. But above all, civil society tends to be disinterested in politics. Alexander Milinkevich, head of the Belarusian "Za Svobodu" opposition movement, explains: "The saddest thing is that people don't believe in elections. The government at first planted fear in people and then indifference"⁵. The regime propaganda and the strict control over mass media played a role too.

Too late to change?

Another reason for popular indifference might be fear for the new. Although ruling in an authoritarian manner for the last 14 years, Lukashenka enjoys a certain popularity among its citizens. He sustains that his government has safeguarded the Belarusians from the economic difficulties and political chaos experienced by other post-Soviet states such as Ukraine, Moldova, and

Georgia. Belarus does indeed have a higher GDP growth than its neighbours (real GDP growth accelerated to 10.4% in January-June 2008, from 8.1% in 2007 as a whole). The Soviet-style economy has guaranteed social benefits to the population. According to the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis, the unemployment rate in the country amounts to the thin 1% (the rate is much lower than the 6.1% of the Russian Federation, the 7% of Ukraine; EU countries average 5.4%, the highest being Slovakia with 11.4%)⁶. Albeit artificially optimistic, the Belarusian unemployment figures show a stable economical situation explaining why the majority of population, especially in the countryside and among the uneducated and the elderly, is unwilling to relinquish the current comfortable status quo. Milinkevich has pointed out that the entire population needs to undertake a process of "de-Sovietization" and "de-communistization"⁷.

Any change at this point would be much more painful than it has been for other transition countries in Central Europe or for the countries of the so-called Coloured Revolutions. Belarus cannot any more count on that extraordinary period around the early 1990s when people were ready to bear hard economic sacrifices for building up a modern state based on economic liberalization and democracy. Furthermore, Central European countries were moved by the strong desire of ending Europe's division by joining both the EU and NATO. The EU membership prospect

⁴ See the OSCE statement on September 29, 2008, <http://www.osce.org/item/33272.html>.

⁵ <http://euobserver.com/9/26822/?rk=1>.

⁶ <http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/economyc/>.

⁷ See Interview, *Quelle situation en Biélorussie?*, Fondation Robert Schuman, May 13, 2008, p. 1.

was a strong incentive for reforming and consolidating democracy. For Belarus NATO and the EU are not a priority and do not have the same symbolic significance they had back in 1989 for Central European countries. According to national surveys conducted between 2000 and 2006, there is a declining sense of European self-identity in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Attitudes towards the EU and the possibility of becoming a member are broadly supportive but there is a substantial percentage of people who find it difficult to express a view or who say to be poorly informed about European matters. In Belarus only 16% of those interviewed are strongly in favour of EU membership (in 2004 they were 25%) while 28% have no view⁸.

Meanwhile, there is a growing academic literature highlighting both some undesirable consequences of EU adhesion (the strengthening of the executive power over the Parliament and the judiciary) and imperfect implementation (see high rates of corruption, weak governance) raising concerns that some achievements might be even reversed (slowing down of reforms, resurgent nationalism, political instability). This suggests that the EU does not necessarily provide aspirants members or close partners with a successful pattern of transformation and above all the EU might be incapable of sustaining in the

⁸ For a deep analysis and surveys data on Russia, Belarus and Ukraine towards Europe, the EU and the EU membership see S. WHITE - J. Korosteleva - I. MCALLISTER, *A Wider Europe? The View from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine*, in «Journal of Common Market Studies», 46, 2, March 2008, pp. 219-241.

long-run a “revolution” especially when this is not wanted by a large share of the society. The fragile political equilibrium of Ukraine and Georgia also shows that without a serious process of domestic reversion and stabilization, the EU aspiration is not enough strong to catalyze a deep national reform process.

The EU itself does not feel the same moral obligation to expand and its institutions, loaded with recent enlargements, might not be able and willing to “absorb” new countries. Not to mention that the potential eligible candidates would be extremely difficult countries to digest not only for their poor economic performance but also for political instability, size and security reasons. And, above all, the consensus over a new enlargement to include other former Soviet republics after the Baltic States is hardly achievable. The European Neighbourhood Policy has been exactly shaped for countries such as Belarus that might be willing to get closer to Brussels but cannot hope for EU membership in the short or medium term.

Belarus will also encounter many difficulties detaching from a Russia that is not any more the weak country of the 1990s, thorn by dramatic domestic upheavals and with a declining international status. Russia is a resurgent power far less tolerant about being betrayed by its former Republics than in the past. Western penetration in its own area of influence (NATO membership prospect for Ukraine and Georgia, US shield in Central Europe)⁹ and

⁹ President Lukashenka highlighted (September 8, 2008) that Minsk and Moscow should respond to a challenge issued by NATO and the

the war in Georgia have made Russia extremely sensitive about safeguarding its *protégées* or special friends like Belarus.

The Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Belarus Alexander Surikov suggested (June 10, 2008) for instance that the deployment of US anti-missile defence programs in Eastern Europe might prompt Russia to place similar facilities in Belarus. According to Surikov, Russia might use Belarusian territory for the deployment of short-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads that would target anti-missile sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Belarus declined to recognize the independence of Georgia's separatist regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia¹⁰.

US following the signing on August 20 of an agreement between Washington and Warsaw on deployment of missile defence elements near the Belarusian border. Lukashenka urged a “proportionate and appropriate” response and pledged that Minsk and Moscow “would do their best to ensure the security of Russian and Belarusian citizens”.

¹⁰ After Medvedev ratified the Russian Duma's decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Lukashenka sent a message to Moscow, stating that with the situation getting ever more complex, the only moral choice for Russia was to support South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He did not, however, offer recognition from Minsk and went on to say that it would be expedient to examine the issue of the two regions' independence at the forthcoming meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Moscow on September 5 (Belapan, August 28), along with the other members of the organization: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. On this, see D. MARPLES, *Belarus Responds*

However, after a meeting with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Lukashenka affirmed that Russian forces behaved “perfectly, in a very calm, wise and beautiful manner”¹¹.

As Krastev has stressed, “If the West persists in ignoring Russia’s concerns and continues to expand NATO in the post-Soviet space, it will merely reintroduce sphere-of-influence politics in Eurasia. But breaking with the policies of the 1990s also presents grave risks, because the EU is not, and cannot be, a traditional great power, and because the West’s weakness may end up rewarding – and encouraging – Russian revanchism”¹². So, if the West keeps irritating Russia, the future of the “in-between” countries might be gloomier.

Different leverages

Lukashenka is certainly inclined to using repression to protect his power, but building a democracy and a modern state requires more than removing an autocratic leader. Any changes in Belarus require economic restructuring and deep social transformations. The EU as a soft power, promoting democracy and respect for human rights, is one of the most fervent supporters of the country’s regime change and modernization. Security is

another reason for having Belarus on the West side. But what can the EU offer and how can it influence the political orientation of the country?

So far, the EU has reacted to the deterioration of democracy in Belarus by recurring to negative conditionality with no success since Belarus does not aspire to the EU membership. In September 1997, the EU suspended contacts and contractual agreements with Belarus and limited assistance to support civil society. In June 2007, the EU also withdrew Belarus’ trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), after the International Labour Organization voiced concern over the curtailing of the rights of trade unions in the country. Belarus also faces one of the most restrictive trade regimes with the EU in the textiles sector. The EU pressure has been mostly ineffective. Instead the EU can play a role in the activation of civil society through the support of media, education, and socialization of people. The travel restrictions placed on the leadership and other responsible officials, based on clear criteria of personal responsibility, need to be accompanied by facilitating travel to the EU of ordinary Belarusians, especially students and young people¹³.

The way the West has exerted pressure on Lukashenka’s regime was also counter-productive. Generally, interfere-

nces from abroad are depicted as a challenge to Belarusian sovereignty while Lukashenka presents himself as the only bulwark against such threats, consolidating its internal legitimacy. The more the West ostracizes Belarus the more the latter seeks partners among “deviant” countries such as Venezuela or “rogue states” like Iran. In July for instance Belarus foreign minister, Syarhei Martynav, was in Tehran for talks with Iranian officials on strengthening economic ties and co-ordinating policies within the Non-Aligned Movement (of which Belarus is the only European member). The same month, the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, arrived in Minsk to meet Lukashenka. Belarus, together with Russia, is supplying Venezuela with modern weaponry. In return, Venezuela has promised to open some of its oil fields for drilling by Belarusian companies. In October Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim visited Belarus with the aim of strengthening the cooperation in international affairs and intensifying trade and economic relations.

Recent Lukashenka’s positive signs towards the West (opposition candidatures, liberation of political prisoners including Aleksander Kozulin, a candidate in the presidential election on 19th March 2006) are to be considered mainly cosmetic moves. Lukashenka is trying to re-brand its country and has even launched a public relations campaign to improve its image abroad¹⁴. The EU

Cautiously to Georgian Crisis, Jamestown Foundation, September 2, 2008, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373335.

¹¹ http://news.belta.by/ru/main_news?id=260409.

¹² I. KRASTEVA, *Unite and rule*, in «The Guardian», September 22, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/22/russia.georgia>.

¹³ On the EU role in democracy promotion and its programmes, P. TAPIOLA, *European Union Policy towards Belarus: An Extended Hand*, in J. FORBRIG - D.R. MARPLES - P. DEMEŠ (eds.), *Prospects for Democracy in Belarus*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006, pp. 65-70.

¹⁴ Lukashenka has engaged Margaret Thatcher’s favorite public relations man, Tim Bell, to improve the image of the government of Belarus, see *Thatcher’s PR man to buff Belarus image*, in «Financial Times», August 7, 2008, <http://w>

seems inclined to soften its stance towards the country as Russia is about to impose a sharp rise in the price of gas. The EU Council of Foreign Ministers decided (13 October 2008) to hold its first high-level talks in four years with Belarus and to lift an EU travel ban on Lukashenka and other members of the country's *nomenklatura* (Viktor Sheyman, Yury Sivakov, Dmitri Pavlichenko, Vladimir Naurov and Lydia Yermoshyna). The surprising EU shift is a political manoeuvre to pull Belarus away from the Kremlin sphere of influence. During the same meeting the Ministers postponed the decision on resuming talks with Russia about the Partnership and Cooperation agreement renewal, allegedly as a reaction to the incomplete withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia. The EU decision on Belarus is neither beneficial for the opposition that thinks that any presidential offer should be ignored nor for the ordinary Belarusians for whom travelling across Europe will be still difficult.

Furthermore, the EU overture follows by a few days (6 October 2008) the visit of the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to Minsk aiming at strengthening ties between the two countries through the implementation of a number of common programmes within the still alive project of a Union State. Russia and Belarus will sign on November 2 an agreement to set up a joint regional air defense system. The countries are developing a joint air defense system in line with Union State plans, which they have been working on since 1997, involving a

common economic, customs, and political space. Belarus considers such an agreement vital in the context of NATO's eastward expansion. The two countries also plan to hold a number of military drills, including a joint strategic command-and-staff exercise, Zapad-2009. In October Belarus will also host comprehensive operational exercises, Osen-2008, as part of the joint strategic command-and-staff exercise Stabilnost-2008. Moreover, Russia assured it would meet its obligations in supplies of arms and military equipment to Belarus.

But the real reason for the EU failure in Belarus is the country economic system and dependency on Russia. 35.6% of Belarusian exports goes to Russia followed by the Netherlands with 12.5%; Ukraine and UK have a slim 5.8% and 5.6 respectively. Belarus imports mainly from Russia (55.6%), followed by a far distanced Germany with 7.8% and by Ukraine with 5.5 (2007 figures). The Belarusian economic weakness clearly emerged on January 1, 2007 when Russia raised the price of its gas supplies to Belarus to \$100 per 1,000 cu m from \$46.7 in 2006. The gas price for Belarus is to gradually increase to the European market level by 2011¹⁵. However, the price for Belarus remains among the lowest of the former Soviet states thanks to the 2007 deal with Gazprom, which bought 50% in the country's pipeline monopoly company Beltrans-

gaz¹⁶. The Russian decision to lift up gas prices proved that Russia can pressure both Belarus and Western Europe (a large share of Europe's energy supplies is shipped through Belarus).

The most rational explication for Russian behaviour is the one offered by Moscow itself: gradual transition to market relations with Belarus in accordance, also, to WTO's rules on preferential trade agreements. Russia also sought to increase its energy trade value, along the strategy of the former Putin presidency to enhance state income through export duties on energy¹⁷. Russia's political elite is not willing to divert the country's strategic resources to recreate the failed Soviet empire. This would in fact imply taking care of former Soviet republics' modernization and primarily of their citizens' social welfare needs. In the West instead, the decision triggered accusations that Moscow is using oil and gas as a political weapon. But it could be argued that – not raising the price of its gas supplies to Minsk – Russians were buying Belarus loyalty.

Russia's decision could be a precious step towards the de-structuration of the government's statist economic model. The stability of Lukashenka's regime is based on huge profits ensured by oil and gas from Russia which consented to guarantee near full employment and a near equal (but low) income for all citizens. In addition, restructuring the fuel sector could cut down a highly

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2aea2ac-649f-11dd-af61-0000779fd18c.html.

¹⁵ According to Russian Ambassador in Minsk Surikov, his country in 2009 could sell its gas to Belarus for \$250 per 1,000 cubic meters, Interfax news agency.

¹⁶ Gazprom agreed to pay \$2.5 billion for half ownership of Beltransgaz.

¹⁷ On this see R. LINDNER, *Friendship Blockaded*, in «SWP Comments» January 2, 2007.

corrupted elite that is a serious obstacle to modernization of the country. The government is already coming under strain as a result of the higher prices now being paid for Russian energy supplies. In Belarus there are high levels of energy consumption due to significant losses of energy in the heating of buildings and to the very low energy efficiency in key sectors such as metallurgical and chemical industries¹⁸. One of the first post-September-election decisions was to pass an energy-saving decree¹⁹. Through cheap energy supplies and re-export of oil products alone, Minsk has earned about \$6,500 million per year.

The government has started shifting away from its statist and populist policies acknowledging the need for more privatization in the major industries, reforming the country collective farming system and reducing subsidies to producers and consumers. This summer the Turkish mobile telephone firm Turkcell announced the acquisition of an 80% stake in the state-owned Belarusian Telecommunication Network (BeST). In October 2007 a controlling stake in the second-largest mobile operator, MDC, was sold to Telekom Austria for US \$1bn. A stake in Belinvestbank was recently sold to Germany's Commerz-

bank, and the government is reportedly considering the sale of shares in petrochemical companies to Russian firms, as well as the privatisation of MAZ, which produces lorries. More economic freedom could mean more political freedom, gradually leading to a democratic regime. Contrary to the process of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, the pattern in Belarus might be reversed and economic liberalization could anticipate and boost political reforms as it might happen in the so-called Asian tigers.

Final remarks

As other former Soviet republics, Belarus suffers the competition of external political actors: on the one hand, the EU and the US and, on the other hand, Russia. These forces have neither the same ascendant nor a comparable leverage on the country. But at variance with Georgia or Ukraine and Moldova, Belarus has not undertaken any political or economic reforms. Within the country the opposition forces are still too weak and fragmented to promote a veritable change. Large strata of the population are quite satisfied with the current situation and fear that any reforms may provoke hard social consequences. Lukashenka's abuses are then tolerated in the name of security and stability. So far the slight breaches of the regime have been caused by market logic. In particular, Russian decision to increase gas prices might destabilize the whole Lukashenka's model. The EU on the contrary has a very limited leverage given the fact that Belarus is not aspiring to a membership or to a closer cooperation. Additionally, the

ENP seems unfit to eventually sustain Belarus transition to market economy considering, in particular, the high social costs it implies in a still "socialist" country.

And yet, the external actors are too confident in the success of the usual paths of democratization neglecting countries structural differences, kind of transition and the overall costs of modernization. The very concept of democracy promotion should be "detoxified" (in the phrase of Tom Carothers from the Carnegie Endowment) while it would be necessary to imagine, as F. Fukuyama auspices, "...ways of supporting Georgia and Ukraine (we could add Belarus) other than by new alliance commitments"²⁰.

It must also be considered that Lukashenka's sporadic overtures to the West have not been the outcome of a Western successful strategy but rather the consequence of the shifting dynamics of his relationship with Russia. The case of Belarus should then be tackled jointly by the EU and Russia and become part of a broader package deal (e.g. discussed in the negotiations for the renewal of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement). The European diplomatic capacity to deal with Moscow (see crisis in Georgia) should be capitalized for sorting out all the critical situations in the area, including Belarus. The EU should try to create regional conditions for a win-win situation avoiding any initiative that ignores Moscow's sensibility. In this effort the bridge role played in Belarus by Poland and Lithuania can be

¹⁸ The natural gas consumption per capita in Ukraine and Belarus is among the highest in the world. See G. GROMADZKI - W. KONOŃCZUK, *Energy Game, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus between the EU and Russia*, Batory Foundation, Warsaw, August 2007.

¹⁹ In Minsk public buildings fitted with movement sensors are shrouded in darkness after sunset while the roads are uncongested. See *The Economist, Dictator at bay*, October 4, 2008, p. 31.

²⁰ F. FUKUYAMA, *Russia and a new democratic realism*, in «Financial Times», September 2, 2008.

particularly useful²¹. Nevertheless, as Poland and Lithuania are the “New Cold Warriors”²² among EU member states, their action should be attentively assessed in order to avoid exacerbating tensions. It seems that Belarus normalization and stabilization mostly depends on the EU capacity to engage Russia. But the first concrete step of the EU towards unfreezing relations with Minsk goes actually in the opposite direction: dividing Belarus and Russia, although Brussels offers too little in exchange. The EU move paradoxically will favour the ruling elite, ignore the opposition and neglect needs and expectations of ordinary people.

²¹ For instance, the Lithuanian foreign minister Petras Vaitiekunas and the Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski met with Belarusian foreign minister, Sergei Martynov, to discuss the possibility to curtail the EU sanctions.

²² The definition is by M. LEONARD - N. POPESCU, *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations*, ECFR Policy Paper, London, November 2007.

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