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Obama's 2010 Nuclear Security Summit and the International Non-proliferation Regime

Since 9/11 the United States see nuclear terrorism as «the most immediate and extreme threat to global security»¹. Some commentators have noted that the chances for a terrorist group to acquire a complete nuclear device from some illegal source is quite unlikely and the most outspoken have underlined that the relevance given to the nuclear terrorist threat seems to have become an obsession in some quarters of the US administration². A more realistic option for a would-be nuclear terrorist could be to work on a dirty nuclear device using radioactive material available from different non-military sources. While these kind of bombs will be less destructive than a complete atomic warhead, the psychological effect on the civilian population would be definitely strong. Nevertheless, whether likely or not, it is the threat posed by the conjunction of loose nuclear weapons and materials around the world and radical terrorism that seems to drive the new

disarmament discussion³, transforming nuclear security into the fourth pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime⁴.

During the last decade the main tools used by the US government in the area of nuclear security have been the creation of international partnerships such as the *Proliferation Security Initiative* (PSI) and the *Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism* (GICNT). The main characteristics of these US-led initiatives are the lack of bureaucratic structure, the flexibility of their membership and the voluntary nature of the actions taken under their aegis. Beside this *ad hoc* approach the US government has pursued a more conventional policy, based on the power of the United Nations, through the sponsorship and approval of Security Council (SC) resolutions 1540 (2004). To a certain extent all the above mentioned actions

³ Her Majesty's Government, *The Road to 2010. Addressing the Nuclear Question in the Twenty first Century*, July 2009, available at <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7675/7675.pdf>.

⁴ S. SQUASSONI, *The New Disarmament Discussion*, in «Current History», 714, January 2009 available at https://www.car.negieendowment.org/files/squassoni_current_history.pdf.

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Abstract

President Barack Obama has announced his intention to host, in April 2010, an International Nuclear Security Summit.

After almost a decade characterized by ad hoc initiatives aimed at curbing the illegal trafficking of nuclear related material, the new US administration seems to be eager to work in order to coordinate the different bilateral and multilateral programs and achieve some sort of institutionalization of the different initiatives.

The Nuclear Security Summit might be the first building block of a new international nuclear proliferation regime but in order to reach a successful conclusion the US government will have to weigh the advantages of institutionalization against the need for flexibility and wider participation.

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¹ President Obama's Speech in Prague, April 2009. For the full text of the speech see note 7.

² In this respect see J. MUELLER, *The Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda*, Oxford University Press, 2009.

integrated the more traditional and bilateral approach embodied in the post-Cold War *Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs* (CTR) in place since 1991.

President Barack Obama has showed interest in the question of nuclear security and disarmament since his times as Congressman in Washington, through the cooperation with Senator Richard Lugar in the context of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Programs⁵, and during the electoral campaign⁶. Once in office Obama reiterated his commitment and articulated a new strategy whose manifesto has been announced in April 2009 during his speech in Prague. In that occasion the US president underlined the necessity to work cooperatively in order to avoid the dangers of nuclear terrorism and explained that: «We should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security

⁵ See for example *Challenges Ahead for Cooperative Threat Reduction*, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C., November 2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9160/challenges_ahead_for_cooperative_threat_reduction_audio.html.

⁶ S.I. SCHWARTZ, *Barack Obama and John McCain on Nuclear Security Issues. Examining the similarities and some important differences in the policies of Obama and McCain*, in «CNS Feature Stories», 25 September 2008, available at http://cns.miis.edu/stories/080925_obamamacain.htm.

that the United States will host within the next year»⁷.

The proposal of a nuclear security summit has been reaffirmed at the end of the L'Aquila G8 meeting in July 2009⁸ and so far it has received positive replies by key actors on the international nuclear scene⁹.

The aim of the Nuclear Security Summit is, in the words of Mark Lippert, chief of staff of the National Security Council, «to lay down an important multilateral piece [...] to sort of tie it [the different initiatives] all together and make sure everybody was coordinated on the same page»¹⁰.

After almost eight years characterized by the

⁷ Text of the speech available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-De-livered/.

⁸ *Addressing the Nuclear Threat. Fulfilling the Promise of Prague at the L'Aquila Summit*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Addressing-the-Nuclear-Threat-Fulfilling-the-Promise-of-Prague-at-the-L'Aquila-Summit/.

⁹ The Russian Federation has already accepted the idea during the G8 Summit in Pittsburgh in September <http://en.rian.ru/world/20090926/156257528.html> and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has already expressed his availability <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/spectre-of-nuclear-terrorism-a-formidable-challenge-pm/522776/>.

¹⁰ J. TAPPER - K. TRAVERS, *Whom Should the White House Invite to Its 2010 Nuclear Non-proliferation Summit?*, 9 July 2009, «ABC News», available at <http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/07/whom-should-the-white-house-invite-to-its-2010-nuclear-nonproliferation-summit.html>.

“proliferation” of different initiatives aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear related material and at enhancing international standards and cooperation in the fight against illegal nuclear trafficking, the Obama administration clearly recognizes the need to streamline the intricate and sometimes overlapping networks of international partnerships mushroomed during the previous administration. The nuclear security summit proposed by the United States represents the first step of a strategy whose objective is the creation of international institutions which could ensure the durability of the different partnership. As the following brief description of the “new nuclear non-proliferation regime” attempts to explain, in order to achieve a successful conclusion of the summit and, above all, to attain the objective of securing loose nuclear materials around the world, the US administration will have to evaluate the results of the different international initiatives hitherto implemented and weight the advantages of institutionalization and coordination of such programs against the need for flexibility and wider membership.

From Bilateral to Global Cooperative Threat Reduction

Since the end of the Cold War the United States clearly perceived the threat to national and international security presented by loose nuclear material. At the beginning of the 90s the territory of the former Soviet Union was the main focus of

the US nuclear security effort. The first piece of the US post-Cold War strategy to secure Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) material was public law 102-484, more widely known as Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, approved by the US Senate in 1991. The bill authorized the appropriation of part of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget for projects whose goal was to assist the dismantlement of the most dangerous elements of the former Soviet Union's WMD military-industrial complex¹¹. Since the beginning of the 90s CTR projects enjoyed a total funding of almost \$7 billion¹², engaged important departments of the US administration and contributed to the destruction and management of hundreds of ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads, and tons of chemical material. Furthermore, CTR attempts to manage the possible spread of knowledge likely to proliferate through unemployed Soviet nuclear scientists in search of a new and remunerative job.

Nevertheless, after more than fifteen years of activity a lively debate seems to take ground in the United States political and scientific community on the possible evolution of the

CTR. The Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Program of the US National Academy for Science has recently published the report *Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction*¹³. After an analysis of the evolution of the CTR programs the Committee proposes to upgrade US policy on Cooperative Threat Reduction from "version 1.0" to "version 2.0".

The new strategy has two important features. On the one hand the report highlights the need to update the internal organization of the different US Government departments involved in the programs in order to achieve more flexibility. On the other hand it underlines the opportunity to widen the participation to, and the geographical scope of, threat reduction projects.

Since its birth in 1991, the number of US departments involved in CTR programs has increased and by 2009 the State Department, the Department of Commerce and the Energy Department have taken budgetary responsibility for a number of projects. The proliferation of competences and programs has usefully widened the scope of the projects but, at the same time, has created difficulties in the coordination of the different agencies.

Moreover, many commentators recognized that the experiences acquired through

the CTR programs in the Russian context could be used as a possible blueprint for the future expansion of the geographical scope of the program. Rose Gottemoeller, now Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance at the State Department, in an article on the Washington Quarterly in 2005, underlined the importance of the CTR experience and the need to use the tools developed in that context as the basis for a geographical expansion of the program¹⁴. To be sure CTR 1.0 has dealt with the dismantling of Albanian chemical weapons and took the lead in assisting and supervising the removal of the Libyan nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, those actions were seen as exceptions of a program mainly tailored on the needs of the former Soviet Union¹⁵.

Possible new target areas of CTR programs are North Korea, in case the six-party talks would lead to the denuclearization of the country; India, since the US-Indian nuclear agreement does not mention security of nuclear facility; Iran and Pakistan. In this latter case the US Senate has recently

¹¹ 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 102-484, October 23, 1992, Title XIV - *Demilitarization of the Former Soviet Union* (also cited as the "Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992").

¹² A. WOOLF, *Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union*, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, pp. 11 ss. Also available at <http://fas.org/sqp/crs/nuke/RL31957.pdf>.

¹³ Full text available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12583.

¹⁴ R. GOTTEMOELLER, *Cooperative Threat Reduction Beyond Russia*, in «The Washington Quarterly», 28, 2, Spring 2005, pp. 145-158, available at http://www.twg.com/05spring/docs/05spring_gottemoeller.pdf.

¹⁵ See in this respect K. LUONGO, *Loose Nukes in New Neighborhoods: The Next Generation of Proliferation Prevention* in *Arms Control Today*, May 2009, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/Luongo.

approved a bill aimed at enhancing the American aid to the country which emphasizes, among other things, the cooperation in tracking and curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and materials and the security of the Pakistani nuclear complex as a fundamental part of the \$1.5 billion aid package approved by Capitol Hill¹⁶. All these cases show the difficulties of expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction to other regions: North Korean diplomatic trajectories do not seem to lead to a de-nuclearization of the country, both the Indian and Pakistani governments do not appear to be willing to put their respective nuclear complex under some sort of US control. Moreover, the idea of adopting a CTR approach to the Iranian case seems definitely premature considering the state of US-Iranian relations.

Finally, as a recent report by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University emphasized, in order to shift from version 1.0 to 2.0 and make the CTR programs more efficient and effective, the US administration will have, during the next fiscal year, to convince the Senate to approve more funding¹⁷.

¹⁶ The complete text of the bill is available at http://frwebgate.acce.ss.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbna.me=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s1707.cps.txt.pdf. See also *Pakistani Parliament to Consider U.S. Aid Bill*, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Global Security Newswire, available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20091007_3033.php.

¹⁷ A. NEWMAN - M. Bunn, *Funding for US Efforts to improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials*

The upgrading of CTR projects will therefore require sustained effort both at the political and economic level. Moreover, the 'globalization' of the CTR program will need to be coordinated with the other nuclear security and counter-proliferation activities launched during the last eight years by the Bush administration.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The Proliferation Security Initiative was launched by the US administration of George W. Bush in May 2003 as a joint effort of like-minded governments which aims at interdicting the illicit trafficking of nuclear material. The discovery of A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network and the disclosure of the importance that such a hidden web had in the development of Iranian, North Korean and Libyan nuclear programs clearly stimulated the US initiative¹⁸.

The PSI lacks any institutional or bureaucratic structure and this characteristic rises some doubts about the durability of the whole project and relies

and Expertise Overseas: A 2009 Update, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, June 2009 available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/2009_Nuclear_Bud_get_Final.pdf.

¹⁸ For the events that led to the disclosure of the Khan network see G. CORERA, *Shopping for the Bomb. Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network*, Oxford University Press, 2006.

exclusively on voluntary actions which are consistent with national and international legal frameworks¹⁹. In practical terms the governments which adhere to the PSI should stop and search shipments, whether by land, air or at sea which passes in their territories in order to stop the possible smuggling of nuclear related material such as radioactive substances, part of a WMD devices and their means of delivery. The statement of principles of interdiction accepted by the 95 countries taking part to the initiative clearly affirms that the members of the PSI should streamline the exchange of information and facilitate the development of common strategies. This peculiar aspect is particularly important because of the pivotal role played by intelligence gathering and exchange in the kind of operation carried out in the PSI context.

It is noticeable that the countries which are part of the PSI cannot intercept ships or cargos in international waters without the permission of the flag-state, the owner of the ship or its captain. From this perspective and despite the growing number of states adhering to the initiative and the boarding agreements reached with countries like Panama, Belize and Liberia, the tools available to the partners in the PSI are rather limited.

Different commentators analyzed the US approach to the fight

¹⁹ Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative available at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm>.

against illegal trafficking of nuclear material embodied in the PSI. Some saw in the initiative the first step for a new global nuclear non proliferation regime²⁰. Others emphasized the lack of transparency and accountability and its incompatibility with accepted international legal frameworks²¹ while some defined it as part of a short-sighted US-led multilateral response to WMD terrorism²².

Five fundamental countries do not take part to PSI actions. India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and China criticize the PSI on different grounds and for different reasons which spans from the necessity to preserve national sovereignty in their territorial waters to the lack of legal basis of the initiative. Moreover, in the cases of India and Pakistan strong internal resistances are coupled with the apparent will to maintain a free hand in the nuclear export area. The Chinese case is especially relevant because of the international position held by Beijing. In fact, China is a recognized Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) and is one of the most important arms' exporter of the world. Furthermore, the

reluctance of the Chinese government to adhere to the PSI has been articulated in several statements which clearly highlight deep legal doubts and the difficulties that the PSI could create to China's foreign policy especially *vis à vis* North Korea²³.

To be sure, the latest North Korean nuclear test in May 2009 has convinced South Korea to join the PSI²⁴. This latest addition, dictated by the serious threat represented by the nuclear activities of the North Korean dictatorship, adds an important element to the composition of the PSI but does not demonstrate its effectiveness. Moreover, Pyongyang's atomic test had a further result. Which seems to add some international legitimacy to the principles of interdiction endorsed by the partners of the PSI. In fact Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), adopted in the aftermath of the nuclear test, gives to member states the authority to intercept and inspects cargoes coming from or sailing to North Korea which are suspected to carry WMD and other military equipment. Although the principle of free navigation in

international waters is preserved, resolution 1874 suggests that if the flag state does not authorize the inspection, the vessel should be escorted to a port for inspection by local authorities²⁵.

The 1540 UNSC Resolution

Resolution 1874 is not first document of the Security Council which calls on all member states to implement a stronger and more assertive non-proliferation and counter-proliferation policy. The most important pronouncement of the United Nations in the area of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is resolution 1540 (2004). To a certain extent the approval by the United Nations Security Council of this resolution represented an attempt to cope with the legal criticisms moved against the PSI. Nevertheless, its adoption rose new questions. The document approved in 2004 calls on all state parties of the United Nations to «adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an

²⁰ See for example J.R. HOLMES - A.C. WINNER, *The Proliferation Security Initiative: a Global Prohibition Regime in the Making?*, in «Defence and Security Analysis», 23, 2007, pp. 281-297.

²¹ M.J. VALENCIA, *The Proliferation Security Initiative: a Glass Half Full*, in «Arms Control Today», June 2007, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Valencia.

²² E. ROSAND, *Combating WMD Terrorism: The Short-Sighted US-led Multilateral Response*, in «International Spectator», 44, March 2009, pp. 81-97.

²³ C. WOLF Jr. - B.G. CHOW - G.S. JONES, *Enhancement by Enlargement. The Proliferation Security Initiative*, National Defense Research Institute, 2008, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RA_ND_MG806.pdf.

²⁴ *South Korea Joins Proliferation Security Initiative*, «Global Security Newswire», 26 May 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090526_6455.php. Until 2009 Seoul participated to the activities of the PSI as an observer in order to avoid diplomatic controversies in its relation with North Korea.

²⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), full text and background notes available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm>.

accomplice, assist or finance them»²⁶.

The most interesting elements of the resolution are the creation of an implementation committee which monitors the execution of the resolution and its adoption under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The 1540 committee is composed both by national representatives and by a pool of experts which supervises and helps the implementation of the resolution. Moreover, the resolution asks to all UN members to handle a detailed report of the activities and policies implemented or planned to put into practice the resolution which the committee gathers and evaluates. Nevertheless, the experience of the last five years shows the differences in implementation among the countries of the United Nations. In fact, some have presented long and detailed reports on the steps taken to fight proliferation²⁷, others have submitted short documents, while some governments have not submitted any report at all²⁸. These differences are mainly due to the disparity in the position of the different governments in the context of the international nuclear order and at the same

time they illustrate the difficulties of creating an inclusive and, above all, effective international non proliferation mechanism. In fact, resolution 1540 is rather vague on the exact actions to be taken by member states to efficiently implement the resolution and this lack of clarity, in turn, impinges the efficacy of the whole provision.

Moreover, the decision to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter rose strong criticisms. Chapter VII entitles the SC to act with respect to threats to peace, breaches to peace and acts of aggression and gives to the SC the power to take practical steps, whether through economic and diplomatic sanctions or through the use of force, if and when its resolutions are not respected²⁹. In the case of resolution 1540 the SC does not authorize the threat or the use of force, which shall be object of a single and different SC deliberation. Nevertheless, the adoption of the resolution under Chapter VII stimulated strong criticism from China and Pakistan that, after a series of clarifications, eventually endorsed the document. Nevertheless, the question about the actions to be taken in case of non-fulfillment of the resolution still remains and both these doubts and the differences in the degree of possible implementation cast some shadow on the effective

implementation of the resolution³⁰.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

In 2006 the US nuclear security strategy acquired a further piece: the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The idea was first launched by President Bush and President Putin during the St. Petersburg summit in July 2006³¹ and some months later, in October 2006, it was endorsed by 13 further governments during a meeting in Rabat, Morocco³². The main aims of the GICNT are to bring together experience and expertise from the non proliferation, counter proliferation, and counterterrorism disciplines; to integrate collective capabilities and resources to strengthen the overall global architecture to combat nuclear terrorism and to provide the opportunity

²⁶ Full text of the resolution available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm>.

²⁷ France presented a very long report, full text available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/612/09/PDF/N0461209.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁸ See in this respect Burkina Faso report available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/231/46/PDF/N0523146.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁹ United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, *Action with respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression*, Articles 39-51, full text available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

³⁰ G.H. OOSTHUIZEN - E. WILMSHURST, *Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, Chatman House Briefing Paper, September 2004, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9266_bp0904unsc1540.pdf.

³¹ Announcing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President V.V. Putin St. Petersburg, Russia, 15 July 2006, available at <http://20012009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69021.htm>.

³² *Partner Nations Endorse Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Statement of Principles*, Fact Sheet Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Washington DC, 7 November 2006, available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/75845.htm>.

for nations to share information and expertise in a legally non-binding environment³³. As Robert Joseph, at the time Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, explained in 2006, the GICNT is an attempt to create a layered defense-in-depth which will enhance the capabilities to secure nuclear material, to identify manage and persecute nuclear terrorism and to manage the possible consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack³⁴. At the moment the GICNT has held more than 30 meetings, workshop and exercises, has reached the number of 76 partners and accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU) and INTERPOL as observers. Like the PSI, the GICNT has not bureaucratic structure and is not institutionalized in any way. However, the nature of the initiative has allowed countries like China, India and Pakistan, which were reluctant to enter into the PSI (see above), to take part to the activities.

The countries of the GICNT created the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG),

an informal advisory body of partner nations which coordinates and organizes the activities necessary for the implementation of the initiative³⁵. The nature of the activities and the lack of additional costs for the members of the GICNT have attracted countries which do not take part to the PSI such as India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, the exclusion of military nuclear facilities from the scope of the initiative and the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of the measures taken under the GICNT still undermine the potentialities of an initiative which however has been definitely better received than the PSI³⁶.

Conclusions

The overview of the different initiatives gives a taste of the approach that Washington decided to take during the last decade. Beside the exclusively bilateral relation with the Russian Federation, rooted in the CTR experience, Washington, together with other partners, preferred the creation of *ad hoc* partnerships in order to address specific problems in defined geographical and issue areas. The absence of institutional framework and bureaucratic mechanisms probably are at the same time their main advantage and disadvantage. The flexibility inherently related to a lack of stringent bureaucratic structure clearly helped initiatives such as the PSI and GICNT to be

accepted by a wide number of governments although the same flexibility put at risk the viability and durability of the activities hitherto carried out. Moreover, the case of resolution 1540 seems to point out the difficulties of a normative approach to the question of nuclear terrorism. In fact, the decision to act under Chapter VII had on the one hand created some rules which shall be followed by state parties but, on the other, produced some clashes with the already existent international instruments aimed at controlling nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and with the sensitivity of key international actors.

What seems to be clear from the short overview of the different initiatives is that the key players in the international community do not seem to be willing to accept strong and binding commitments which imply stringent actions, like the provision of resolution 1540, and rather prefer to adhere on a case by case base, to different initiatives which could protect their national interest and sovereignty. Although nuclear terrorism is a common concern, in order to strengthen the "fourth pillar" of the nuclear non-proliferation regime the US administration will have to tread a careful balance between the need to ensure the long-term survivability of the different initiatives and the necessity of a wider and effective participation which a stronger institutionalization is likely to impinge. The nuclear security summit will be the first step of this strategy and, if successful, could help to lay

³³ See GICNT, *Statement of Principles*, Bureau of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Department of State, Washington D.C. available at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/126995.htm>.

³⁴ R. ALCARO, *The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear terrorism: Pig Potential Limited Impact?*, in «International Spectator», 44, March 2009, pp. 99-112 and N. RONZITTI (ed.), *Coordinating Global and Regional Efforts to Combat WMD Terrorism*, in «Quaderni IAI», 15, March 2009 available at http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_15_selection.pdf.

³⁵ The initial participants of the IAG are Russia, the United States, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

³⁶ R. ALCARO, cit.

the basis of a future multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime which will take advantage of the experiences gathered both at bilateral and multilateral basis. Although the long-term plans of the Obama administration largely depend on the discussion of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear questions, a success of the forthcoming summit will certainly help to gather consensus around an international scheme which will curb nuclear proliferation and help creating a positive international environment for the discussions which will be carried out in the context of the next Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010.

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